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CHILD WELFARE’S SCARLET LETTER: HOW A PRIOR
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CAN
PERMANENTLY BRAND A PARENT AS UNFIT


VIVEK S. SANKARAN
ABSTRACT

In many jurisdictions, once a parent has her rights terminated to one child,
the State can use that decision to justify the termination of parental rights to
another child. The State can do so regardless of whether the parent is fit to parent
the second child. This article explores this practice, examines its origins, and
discusses its constitutional inadequacies.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Generally speaking, the law does not allow courts to decide cases based
solely on irrebuttable presumptions created by an individual’s past
transgressions. For example, a defendant in a criminal case cannot be found
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guilty of a new offense simply because she committed crimes in the past.1 In
fact, generally speaking, evidence of those past crimes is only admissible for
specific purposes and cannot be used to prove a defendant’s bad character or
propensity to commit the type of crime at issue.2 Similarly, rules of evidence
strictly limit the admissibility of past crimes to impeach a witness’s credibility at
trial, recognizing that an individual’s character can change over time.3 These
basic recognitions are rooted in the longstanding principle that “in our system of
jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than persons, and thus a jury may look only to
the evidence of the events in question, not defendants’ prior acts in reaching its
verdict.”4 In other words, a prior bad act does not forever render an individual
guilty of future crimes.
But child welfare cases—actions in which the State tries to forcibly take
children from unfit parents and potentially terminate parental rights—are more
complicated. Predicting whether a parent will harm a child and is therefore unfit
is an imprecise, subjective task, requiring courts to consider a myriad of factors
including a parent’s prior acts of abuse, use of drugs, or criminal history. The
general proposition that a juvenile court must consider a parent’s history as one
factor in determining whether a parent is unfit is beyond dispute.5
Even so, the United States Supreme Court has limited the types of
inferences that the State may rely upon when it seeks to infringe upon the
fundamental right to parent. For over a century, the Court has recognized the
sacred, constitutional right of parents to raise their children without unreasonable
government interference6 and has observed that parents need not be “model
parents” to retain their parental rights.7 In Stanley v. Illinois, the United States
1. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (proscribing admission of evidence of past crimes to prove
that a defendant has a propensity for certain crimes and is, therefore, guilty).
2. Id. But see FED. R. EVID. 414 (allowing prior crimes to be admitted in specific cases for
any relevant purpose, including a person’s propensity to commit this specific type of crime, in
child molestation cases).
3. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (limiting uses for which evidence of past convictions may
be admitted to attack a witness’s credibility).
4. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988).
5. See, e.g., In re Adam B., 2016 IL App (1st) 152037, ¶ 48 (“[T]he neglect of one minor is
admissible as evidence of the neglect of another minor under a parent’s care.”); In re LaFlure, 210
N.W.2d 482, 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (“How a parent treats one child is certainly probative of
how that parent may treat other children.”).
6. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (invalidating a grandparent visitation
statute that did not give deference to the wishes of parents and holding that “it cannot now be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”); Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534−35 (1925) (finding that a law prohibiting parents from sending
children to private schools “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399, 401 (1923) (striking down a law that prevented parents from choosing that their children
be taught German, recognizing that liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
include the right to “establish a home and bring up children” and “the power of parents to control
the education of their own” children).
7. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
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Supreme Court circumscribed a juvenile court’s ability to rely on irrebuttable
presumptions in lieu of determining a parent’s actual unfitness.8 There, the Court
rejected a statutory scheme that allowed the State to conclusively presume that
fathers were unfit based solely on the fact that they had failed to marry the
children’s mothers—making their actual fitness irrelevant.9 The Court
emphasized that juvenile courts cannot ignore “present realities in deference to
past formalities.”10 In striking down the law, the Court famously noted that
“[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative
issues of competence and care, . . . it needlessly risks running roughshod over
the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.”11
The Stanley Court clearly articulated the constitutional mandate that
juvenile courts determine the actual fitness of parents prior to intervening in the
parent-child relationship. Yet unsurprisingly, legislatures have tried to relieve
courts of this mandate in the guise of protecting children. For example, a
longstanding practice in some jurisdictions places children in foster care based
solely on the fitness of one parent, regardless of whether the other parent is
actually unfit.12 In 2014, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down that practice,
noting that “[m]erely describing the doctrine foreshadows its constitutional
weakness.”13
This article explores another legislative attempt to deny courts of their
constitutional obligation to adjudicate the actual unfitness of parents. When
Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”) in 1997, it
invited states to violate Stanley’s holding by encouraging them to create
irrebuttable presumptions of unfitness based solely on a parent’s prior
termination of parental rights (“TPR”). While ASFA continued to require states
to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family once it places a child in foster
care,14 it allowed states to forgo making such efforts when a parent’s rights to
another child had been terminated in the past—regardless of the circumstances
of the prior TPR and the parent’s current fitness—and permitted them to proceed
immediately to terminate that parent’s rights again.15 States embraced this
invitation and enacted statutes that now authorize courts to find grounds to

8. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
9. Id. at 658.
10. Id. at 657.
11. Id. at 656−57.
12. See Angela Greene, The Crab Fisherman and His Children: A Constitutional Compass
for the Non-Offending Parent in Child Protection Cases, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 173, 182−89, 198
(2007); Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s Disregard for
the Constitutional Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 63−64 (2009).
13. In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Mich. 2014).
14. Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2012).
15. See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
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terminate parental rights based solely on a parent’s prior TPR.16 These statutes
permit courts to terminate a parent’s rights based on that prior TPR rather than a
parent’s actual unfitness. For example, if a court in such a jurisdiction terminated
a parent’s rights two years prior due to the parent’s addiction to drugs, it could
use that decision to automatically establish grounds to terminate rights to a new
child regardless of evidence of the parent’s present sobriety. A parent’s past
actions are conclusively determinative of future conduct.
Take, for example, the case of J.S.L. v. Jefferson County Department of
Human Resources, in which the trial court relied upon a parent’s prior TPR to
terminate parental rights to another child.17 The court issued its decision even
though there was no evidence that the mother was still using controlled
substances, engaging in relationships with domestic violence, or lacking the
ability to care for her children—factors that led to her prior terminations.18
These facts prompted the children’s guardian ad litem to remark, “[N]o case in
this [lawyer’s] experience has caused greater angst to the soul of this humble
lawyer than the case presently before this [c]ourt . . . .”19 But due to the statutory
framework created by ASFA, the court still terminated the parent’s rights. These
types of stories are not uncommon to practitioners in the field.
This article challenges the constitutionality of this practice and argues that
federal and state statutes must be amended to prohibit the use of irrebuttable
presumptions in TPR cases. Part II discusses the constitutional floor in TPR
cases created by Stanley and subsequent United States Supreme Court case law.
Part III explores how and why Congress invited states to take unconstitutional
shortcuts when a case involves a parent with a prior TPR and describes how
states embraced Congress’ request. Part IV examines how courts have responded
to constitutional challenges to statutes establishing a parent’s unfitness based on
a prior TPR and demonstrates how many courts have failed to properly interpret
Stanley’s central holding. Finally, Part V details possible legislative fixes to
bring statutes in conformity with constitutional mandates and Part VI provides
concluding remarks.

16. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-27-341 (2015 & Supp. 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(2)(m) (2016); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(6) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(1)(i) (West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-2271(a)(1) (Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-323(d)(3)(v) (LexisNexis
2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(l) (West 2012 & Supp. 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260C.301(b)(4) (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(1)(d) (2015) (referencing MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-3-423(2)(e) (2015)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(2) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. §
128.105(1)(b) (2015) (referencing NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.393(3)(c) (2015)); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 26-8A-26.1(6) (2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (West Supp. 2016); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(E) (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-604(b)(7)(C) (LexisNexis 2015 &
Supp. 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(c)(i) (2015).
17. J.S.L. v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t of Human Res., 180 So. 3d 872 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).
18. Id. at 880 (Moore, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 883.
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II.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
A. Overview of Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The right of parents to direct the care, custody, and control of their children
is an element of liberty protected by due process that is well established under
the law. Numerous Supreme Court “decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family
is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”20 This right protects
reciprocal interests held by both parents and children. It is “the interest of a
parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children,”21 and of the children in not being dislocated from the “emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association” with the parent.22
The law’s understanding of the family rests on a belief “that the natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”23
Any legal adjustment of these rights and obligations affects this fundamental
human relationship, so courts have zealously guarded this relationship from
unwarranted governmental intrusion, even noting that the fundamental liberty
interest “does not evaporate simply because [parents] have not been model
parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”24 In fact,
“[e]ven when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”25
Three United States Supreme Court cases, Stanley v. Illinois,26 Santosky v.
Kramer,27 and Quilloin v. Walcott,28 set forth, respectively, three basic
constitutional requirements before a State can permanently terminate the rights
of a parent: 1) that the State must prove that a parent is actually unfit; 2) that
unfitness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence; and 3) that such a
decision cannot be based solely on a finding that termination would be in the
child’s best interest.
As noted above, in Stanley, the Court prevented the State from taking
children away from their parents absent a finding of actual unfitness.29 The
20. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123−24 (1989) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children [] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).
21. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
22. Smith v. Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
23. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69 (noting the
“traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child”).
24. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
25. Id.
26. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.
27. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745.
28. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
29. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
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Court noted that the State registers “no gain towards its declared goals when it
separates children from the custody of fit parents.”30 As such, although creating
an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness would always be “cheaper and easier
than [an] individualized determination[,]” the Court still required the State to
prove a father’s unfitness prior to stripping him of his right to care for his
child.31 It recognized that the Constitution has “higher values than speed and
efficiency.”32
Next, in Santosky, the Court held that to terminate parental rights, the State
must prove parental unfitness by at least clear and convincing evidence.33 In
TPR cases, the State seeks “not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty
interest, but to end it.”34 The “parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the
decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding
one.”35 The Court observed that “until the State proves parental unfitness, the
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing [the] erroneous
termination of their natural relationship.”36
Finally, in Quilloin, the Court—in a private adoption case—observed that
the State may not permanently sever the ties between a father and his child based
solely on a finding that terminating parental rights was in the child’s best
interest.37 The Court noted, “We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause
would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural
family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in
the children’s best interest.’”38 This statement is consistent with the Court’s
observations—on numerous occasions—that “the ‘best interests of the child’
standard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively encourage them to
rely on their own personal values.”39 For example, in Troxel v. Granville, the
Court invalidated a visitation statute that permitted a court to infringe upon a
parent’s rights and order grandparent visitation—over a parent’s objection—
based solely on its finding that visitation would be in the child’s best interest.40

30. Id. at 652.
31. Id. at 656−57.
32. Id. at 656.
33. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768−69 (1982).
34. Id. at 759.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 760.
37. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
38. Id. (quoting Smith v. Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977)
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).
39. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72−73 (2000).
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B. Application of Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Read together, these decisions demonstrate that the Constitution requires
that the State prove a parent’s actual unfitness by clear and convincing evidence
prior to terminating that parent’s rights to her child. Relying on these and other
decisions, a few appellate courts have struck down TPR statutes that relieved
courts of their constitutional obligation to determine a parent’s actual unfitness.
For example, the Kansas Court of Appeals struck down a scheme that permitted
courts to presume a parent’s unfitness based solely on the fact that a child had
been out of the home for a year and that the parent had refused to complete the
court-approved treatment plan.41 The Court of Appeals held that the father was
constitutionally entitled to a hearing to contest the unfitness presumption prior to
the court’s finding.42
Similarly, the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected two statutory provisions
that allowed courts to automatically find a parent’s unfitness without actually
assessing that parent’s fitness. In In re S.F., the Court of Appeals struck down a
provision that conclusively established grounds for termination based on a
parent’s criminal conviction that resulted from the death of another child due to
child abuse.43 It found that the automatic presumption denied parents of their
“right of rebuttal.”44 Similarly, in In re H.G., the Supreme Court of Illinois
invalidated a statute that presumed a parent’s unfitness if a child had been in
foster care for fifteen out of the past twenty-two months and the parent failed to
establish that it was in the child’s best interest to be reunified within six
months.45 The court observed that the statute “fails to account for the fact that, in
many cases, the length of a child’s stay in foster care has nothing to do with the
parent’s ability or inability to safely care for the child”46 and declined to
recognize that the “State has a compelling interest in removing children from
foster care in an expeditious fashion when that removal is achieved in an
unconstitutional manner.”47 These decisions—correctly applying Supreme Court
jurisprudence—reaffirm that the Constitution does not permit the creation of
statutes that allow courts to terminate a parent’s rights without first adjudicating
a parent’s current fitness.
Yet, unsurprisingly, in times where legislatures perceive the need to address
a crisis, they may be susceptible to overlooking constitutional doctrine when
passing laws. This is precisely what happened when Congress passed ASFA and
encouraged states to terminate a parent’s rights based on a prior termination,
regardless of the circumstances of the prior termination and the parent’s current
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

In re X.D., 340 P.3d 1230, 1232−34 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 1232−33.
In re S.F., 834 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
Id.
In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864, 874 (Ill. 2001).
Id. at 872.
Id. at 874.
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level of fitness. These developments are detailed in the next section of this
article.
III.
ASFA INVITES STATES TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS BASED ON PRIOR
DECISIONS TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Enactment of ASFA
President Clinton signed ASFA into law on November 19, 1997, with wide
bipartisan support.48 In passing the law, Congress sought to “shift the pendulum
of the child protection system away from what many saw as an unreasonable
emphasis on family preservation and towards permanency, and thus health and
safety, for the children.”49 Congress noted a “growing belief that Federal
statutes, the social work profession, and the courts sometimes err[ed] on the side
of protecting the rights of parents” and, supporters of the legislation argued, “[a]s
a result, too many children [were] subjected to long spells of foster care or
[were] returned to families that reabuse[d] them.”50
Specifically, Congress was concerned that the provision in the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 requiring states to make reasonable
efforts to reunify children with their families had become unreasonable and was
forcing child welfare agencies to provide services to dangerous parents.51 In
other words, Congress was concerned that “[s]tates were too focused on efforts
to return abused and neglected children to their homes, thus endangering
children in the name of family preservation.”52 Senator Mike DeWine, who
authored the legislation, proclaimed that providing services to dangerous parents
was “unnecessary,” “unwise,” and “simply wrong.” 53 As such, Congress sought
to allow states to adjust their practices “to move more efficiently toward
terminating parental rights and placing children for adoption.”54
The legislative history details a specific concern shared by various
stakeholders and legislators about providing services to parents whose rights to
previous children had been terminated. Sue Badeau, representing the group
Voices for Adoption, urged Congress to include “termination of parental rights
of a sibling as one of the exceptions [to the reasonable efforts requirement], with

48. For more information about the events leading up to ASFA, see Katherine Q. Seelye,
Clinton to Approve Sweeping Shift in Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/us/clinton-to-approve-sweeping-shift-in-adoption.html
[https://perma.cc/64QA-8CCJ].
49. Kathleen S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and ASFA, 29 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 224 (2009).
50. H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 8 (1997).
51. See id. at 7−11.
52. Bean, supra note 49.
53. 143 CONG. REC. S12,670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
54. H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 8 (1997).
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the provision applying to a parent whose rights have been terminated and who
will not respond to rehabilitative services and a court finds it unlikely that further
services would result in reunification.”55
Professor Richard Gelles, then director of the Family Violence Research
Program at the University of Rhode Island, supported this view and told
Congress the story of a child named David,56 a fifteen-month-old boy killed by
his mother, whose rights to a previous child had been terminated.57 Despite the
fact that the mother had severely abused a sibling and had failed to benefit from
services, Gelles stated that the agency had allowed the mother to take David
home one week after his birth.58 Gelles observed that “the workers when we
interviewed them said we could not have gotten a court to act on this because we
had to make reasonable efforts to reunify David with his mother.”59
Senator DeWine seized on this story and noted that Gelles recommended
ending “parental rights quickly in cases like David’s in which abusing parents
have already lost custody of another youngster.”60 Senator DeWine also
presented a hypothetical that involved a cocaine-addicted mother whose rights to
seven children had been terminated and who had a new baby born addicted to
cocaine.61 According to Senator DeWine, case workers, when presented with the
hypothetical, stated that under the old statutory framework, they would still be
legally obligated to put the family back together, a result DeWine described as
favoring “the interests of dangerous and abusive adults over the health and safety
of children.”62
Congress also heard examples from Professor Gelles of state laws that
already permitted states to terminate parental rights based on a parent’s prior
terminations. Professor Gelles described a Rhode Island law, enacted three years
prior to ASFA, which allowed courts to consider a prior termination as “prima
facie evidence for terminating parental rights” to another child.63 Gelles justified
this law by arguing that it would be better for the system to unnecessarily
55. Child Welfare Reform: Hearing on S. 511, S. 742, and H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on
Social Security and Family Policy of the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 40 (1997) (statement
of Susan Badeau, Rep., Voice for Adoption).
56. Gelles published a book about David’s story. See generally RICHARD J. GELLES, THE
BOOK OF DAVID: HOW PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST CHILDREN’S LIVES (1996).
57. Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children: Hearing on S. Hrg. 104692 Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 104th Cong. 11 (1996) (statement of Richard
J. Gelles, Director, Family Violence and Research Program) [hereinafter Improving the Well-Being
of Abused and Neglected Children Hearing].
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 142 CONG. REC. S80,5713 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
61. Barriers to Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 8 (1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine) [hereinafter
Barriers to Adoption Hearing].
62. Id.
63. Federal Adoption Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 93 (1995).
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terminate a fit parent’s rights rather than place a child in a potentially dangerous
home. He challenged Congress:
Do you want to make mistakes that ultimately end up in
children having poor developmental outcomes or even being
killed, or do you want to take children away, maybe
inappropriately from parents, maybe a little bit early because the
system is tilted toward the best interest of the child? It would be
the latter system I think that we need.64
Supporting Gelles’ perspective, an official from the Rhode Island Office of
the Child Advocate argued that it would be “really ridiculous” to have a child
welfare agency “start all over again in making reasonable efforts” where a parent
has previously had her parental rights terminated.65 Advocates agreed,
describing laws in states like Utah66 and California67 that allowed agencies to
proceed directly to the termination of parental rights stage where parents had
rights to another child terminated. Together, these advocates and others
persuaded Congress for the need to act.
To remedy these perceived problems, Congress passed ASFA and gave
states wide discretion not to make reasonable efforts to reunify when a parent
had her rights to another child terminated involuntarily in the past.68 Congress
allowed states to do this regardless of how long ago the prior TPR had occurred,
the reasons for the prior TPR, or the current fitness of that parent. In other
words, Congress permitted states to ignore the circumstances surrounding the
prior TPR and the steps the parent had taken in the interim to change those
circumstances. Additionally, Congress invited states to create their own list of
aggravating circumstances that excused them from making any effort to work
with a family.69 In short, Congress, responding to the impassioned testimony it
heard, encouraged states to take shortcuts in cases involving a parent with a prior
TPR, with the hope of expediting the adoption of children in such cases.
B. States’ Embrace of ASFA
States broadly accepted Congress’ invitation. Every state, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands enacted laws that allowed them to

64. Id.
65. Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 61, at 124.
66. Id. at 78−79 (testimony of Robert Dean, foster parent from Omaha, Nebraska).
67. Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 57, at
57 (statement of Peter Digre, Director, Dep’t of Children and Family Services, Los Angeles
County).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2012). Congress also invited states to forgo reasonable
efforts where a parent committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent,
aided or abetted to commit such a murder or voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault
that resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent. Id.
69. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i).
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bypass the provision of reasonable efforts where parents had prior TPRs,70 a
practice that has been upheld by appellate courts examining the issue.71
Although a few states require the agency to demonstrate that the parent failed to
remedy the situation that led to the prior TPR, most do not.72 Thus, in most
jurisdictions, upon the filing of a petition involving a parent with a prior TPR, a
court can make a finding that the child welfare agency need not make any efforts
to reunify the family and can proceed immediately to consider the agency’s
request to terminate the parent’s rights to the child. The agency is relieved of any
obligation to try to salvage the family unit.
But many states have gone beyond what Congress specifically encouraged
and have passed laws permitting courts to actually find grounds to terminate a
parent’s rights to another child based on the prior TPR.73 Over thirty states have
done so. These statutes fall into three broad categories. Seventeen states permit
courts to find grounds to terminate parental rights based solely on that parent’s
prior TPR.74 In these states, courts can rely exclusively on the prior TPR to find
grounds to terminate. Courts need not consider any other factors in making this
finding. In other words, the prior TPR—regardless of how long ago it
occurred—relieves the State from proving that a parent is currently unfit.
Approximately ten states allow courts to rely upon a prior TPR but also
require the State to demonstrate something in addition to the prior TPR.75 For
70. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, Reasonable Efforts to Preserve or Reunify
Families and Achieve Permanency for Children 2 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/
systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/reunify/ [https://perma.cc/LV6X-BCQT].
71. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy H., 63 Cal. App. 4th 470, 478 (1998); In re G.B., 754 N.E.2d
1027, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); In re Heather C., 2000 ME 99, ¶¶ 31–32, 751 A.2d 448, 457; In
re L.N., 2004 SD 126, ¶ 15, 689 N.W.2d 893, 898.
72. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-846 (Supp.
2016); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West Supp. 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.102 (West
2014 & Supp. 2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.2015 (West 2014 & Supp. 2016). Connecticut
only allows the state to bypass reasonable efforts for a parent with a prior termination that occurred
within the past three years. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-111b (West 2016).
73. In every state, in addition to finding grounds for termination, the court must also find that
termination is in the child’s best interest, an inherently subjective determination.
74. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016); ARK. CODE ANN. §
9-27-341 (2015 & Supp. 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(2)(m) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1103(a)(6) (2009); FLA. STAT. Ann. § 39.806(1)(i) (West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
38-2271(a)(1) (Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-323(d)(3)(v) (LexisNexis 2012);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(l) (West 2012 & Supp. 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260C.301(b)(4) (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(1)(d) (2015) (referencing MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-3-423(2)(e) (2015)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(2) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. §
128.105(1)(b) (2015) (referencing NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.393(3)(c) (2015)); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 26-8A-26.1(6) (2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (West Supp. 2016); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(E) (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-604(b)(7)(C) (LexisNexis 2015 &
Supp. 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(c)(i) (2015).
75. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086(c)(8); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(1)–(b)(17);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116(1)(d) (West 2014 & Supp. 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
625.090(2)(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015(3)(k) (2004 & Supp.
2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (1-A)(D) (2004 & Supp. 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 7B-1111(a)(9) (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-904(B)(6) (West 2009 & Supp.

SANKARAN_PUBLISHERPROOF_9.10.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

696

11/12/2017 10:25 PM

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

Vol.41:685

example, Kentucky requires evidence that the “[t]he conditions or factors which
were the basis for the previous termination finding have not been corrected.”76
Arizona, in addition to only allowing courts to consider prior TPRs that occurred
within the past two years, also requires proof that the parent is “currently unable
to discharge parental responsibilities due to the same cause.”77 North Carolina
requires a finding that “the parent lacks the ability or willingness to establish a
safe home.”78 In these jurisdictions, courts might consider—among other
factors—the circumstances of the prior TPR, how long ago it occurred, and the
parents’ efforts to remedy past neglect.
Finally, a small number of jurisdictions permit courts to base a TPR on a
prior TPR but limit this application to prior TPRs that occurred within a specific
time period. For example, in Connecticut, Missouri, and Wisconsin, courts may
only rely upon prior TPRs that occurred within three years of the current
action.79 So while these jurisdictions do not require the State to prove that a
parent is currently unfit, they do establish some time limits on how long a
parent’s prior TPR can be used as a proxy for continued unfitness.
Unsurprisingly, lawyers have challenged these statutory schemes by directly
appealing TPR decisions on the grounds that they violate the fundamental
principles of Stanley, Santosky, and other Supreme Court cases. But while
lawyers have succeeded in a few of these cases, most have failed. The next
section details challenges to these statutes and explains why courts affirming
these statutes have erred.
IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PRIOR TPR STATUTES
Lawyers challenging the constitutionality of prior TPR statutes have relied
upon Stanley to frame their arguments. Prior TPR statutes violate Stanley by
relieving courts of their constitutional obligation to determine whether a parent is
actually unfit prior to stripping her—permanently—of her right to care for her
child. In doing so, the statutes create an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness,
80
which is exactly the type of practice that Stanley condemns. As the United
States Supreme Court unequivocally decreed in Vlandis v. Kline, “[A] statute
creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it
81
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.502(6) (2015); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iv) (2013 & Supp.
2016).
76. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2)(h) (LexisNexis 2014).
77. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(10) (2014 & Supp. 2016).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1111(a)(9).
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-111b(b) (West 2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447(5)(6)(b)
(West Supp. 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(10)(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016).
80. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
81. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) (quoting Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329
(1932)).
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A. Some Courts Have Invalidated Prior TPR Statutes
A few appellate courts have embraced this argument. The Florida Supreme
Court, in Florida Department of Children & Families v. F.L.,82 interpreted
Florida’s prior TPR statute to require the State to prove, in addition to the prior
termination of parental rights, that there is a “substantial risk of harm to the
current child.”83 While the court noted that “the circumstances leading to the
prior involuntary termination” would be highly relevant to the court’s
determination of whether the current child is at risk, 84 it also explained that
“[w]hile a parent’s past conduct necessarily has some predictive value as to that
parent’s likely future conduct, positive life changes can overcome a negative
history.”85 It therefore provided the following instructions to trial courts:
[I]f the parent’s conduct that led to the involuntary termination
involved egregious abuse or neglect of another child, this will
tend to indicate a greater risk of harm to the current child. The
amount of time that has passed since the prior involuntary
termination will also be relevant. A very recent involuntary
termination will tend to indicate a greater current risk. Finally,
evidence of any change in circumstances since the prior
involuntary termination will obviously be significant to a
determination of risk to a current child.86
The Michigan Court of Appeals reached a similar outcome in In re Gach.87
There, the court struck down a statute that allowed trial courts to presume
parental unfitness for parents with prior TPRs, requiring that the decision,
instead, be based on the child’s best interests, as established by clear and
convincing evidence.88 In finding this practice “constitutionally deficient[,]”89
the court found that the statute failed to require courts to find, by clear and
convincing evidence, “that the parent had failed to remedy the earlier abuse or
negligence that led to the earlier termination.”90 In the court’s eyes, this was a
fatal defect.
The Kansas Court of Appeals, in In re J.L., embraced a similar argument.91
There, the State based its entire case on the fact that a parent’s rights to her
children had been terminated eight years prior to the current case.92 The Court of

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004).
Id. at 609.
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id.
In re Gach, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 783 (Apr. 19, 2016).
Id. at *18−19.
Id. at *16.
Id. at *18−19.
In re J.L., 891 P.2d 1125 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 1127.
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Appeals observed that permitting the State to terminate the parent-child
relationship “by relying on a journal entry filed in an eight-year-old termination
procedure makes the process much too easy on the part of the government.”93 It
noted its disbelief that “presumptions derived from eight-year-old lawsuits
should shift the burden of proof in parental termination cases”94 and concluded
that the net result of these statutes is an “unacceptable risk that a parent judged
unfit many years ago will erroneously be adjudged unfit today for no other
reason than a presumption based on the result in a case which has become
irrelevant.”95 To remedy the unconstitutional statute, the court instructed trial
courts to consider additional factors, including the passage of time, whether the
facts in the current case resembled those from the past, and whether the cases
involved the same children.96 Employing this reasoning, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, in interpreting its statute to prohibit terminations based solely on
past TPRs, observed that “[p]ast actions are not sufficient to brand a parent unfit
for life.”97
B. Many Courts Have Refused to Invalidate Prior TPR Statutes
In contrast to these decisions, other courts have refused to invalidate prior
TPR statutes, citing a variety of differing, but equally unpersuasive, rationales.
Some courts have simply stated that a prior TPR is evidence of a parent’s
continuing and permanent unfitness, an argument that contravenes the legal
system’s recognition that an individual’s guilt cannot be defined solely based on
prior findings. A Minnesota court noted that “[a] parent who has had his or her
parental rights involuntarily terminated has been adjudicated as posing a threat to
the child now and into the future.”98 One in New Mexico found that “in most of
the reported cases, there is a very real relationship between the past conduct and
the current abilities.”99 A third from California concluded, “Experience has
shown that with certain parents . . . the risk of recidivism is a very real
concern. Therefore, when another child of that same parent is adjudged a
dependent child, it is not unreasonable to assume [that future parenting] efforts
will be unsuccessful.”100
The reasoning in these cases flatly contradicts Stanley, which barred courts
from relying on irrebuttable presumptions to find a parent to be currently unfit
based solely on past conduct.101 But independent of the legal analysis, the logic
93. Id. at 1130.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1131.
96. Id. at 1136.
97. In re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283, 1287 (R.I. 1998).
98. In re Child of P.T. & A.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
99. State ex rel. Children Youth & Families Dep’t v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 850 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2002).
100. In re Baby Boy H., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 799 (Ct. App. 1998).
101. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656−57 (1972).
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is nonsensical. To suggest that a parent whose rights were terminated ten years
ago due to a toxic domestic violence relationship will therefore remain unfit
forever—regardless of the choices she has made in the interim—ignores the
reality that people are capable of changing.102 Even state legislatures have
recognized this. At least nine states now permit the reinstatement of parental
rights after a court terminates the rights of the parent, allowing children to return
home to parents previously found to be unfit.103 These statutes reflect the reality
that the ability of parents to care for children can—and does—change.
Other courts have upheld the constitutionality of prior TPR statutes,
suggesting that Stanley only required courts to give parents notice and an
opportunity to be heard.104 Thus, as long as courts give parents the ability to
appear and present their case, their constitutional rights are not disturbed. But
this reasoning reflects a complete misunderstanding of Stanley. While Stanley
did discuss the father’s opportunity to be heard, its central holding required the
State to prove the father’s current unfitness prior to removing his child from his
custody.105 Thus, Stanley announced that demonstrating the father’s unfitness
was a substantive burden shouldered by the State prior to placing a child in
foster care.106 Simply providing parents with notice and an opportunity to be
heard cannot satisfy this constitutional burden.
Courts in Wisconsin have taken a more creative approach—they have
upheld their prior TPR statute by applying a theory based on the interconnected
nature of decisions made by the juvenile court prior to the TPR hearing.107 These

102. See, e.g., In re Gach, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 783, at *18−19 (Apr. 19, 2016)
(reversing TPR where the mother’s prior TPR was based on her involvement in a domestic
violence relationship she was no longer in).
103. For more information about reinstatement of parental rights statutes, see Reinstatement
of Parental Rights State Statute Summary, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/reinstatement-of-parental-rights-state-statute-sum.as
px#Statutory Charr [https://perma.cc/A3YL-SBEL].
104. See, e.g., In re T.S.B., 2008 MT 23, ¶ 38, 341 Mont. 204, 177 P.3d 429; In re A.P., 2007
MT 297, ¶ 22, 340 Mont. 39, 172 P.3d 105; In re W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 713 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004).
105. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649 (“[A]s a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him . . . .”).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Dane Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. P.P. (In re Diana P.), 2005 WI App 32, ¶
32, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344 (“The findings that are required for a court to proceed
against a parent at each of the steps prior to the final step . . . involve an evaluation of a parent’s
fitness. It is the cumulative effect of the determinations made at each of the previous steps that
causes the findings made under [the statute] to amount to unfitness.”); Oneida Cty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. v. Nicole W. (In re Tatiana A.W.), 2009 WI App 56U, ¶ 11–12, 317 Wis. 2d 64, 768
N.W.2d 64 (finding that requirements for a showing of abandonment, abuse, or neglect and for a
termination of parental rights to another child within the prior three years “ensure[] courts will
have made specific findings reflecting the parent’s fitness over a short span of time before the
parent’s rights can be terminated”); Brown Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ivan L.-C. (In re
Ivannies L.), 2008 WI App 36U, ¶ 12, 308 Wis. 2d 397, 74 N.W.2d 606 (citing In re Diana P.,
2005 WI App 32, ¶ 32); State v. Lawana R. (In re Damone R.), 2007 WI App 230U, ¶ 13, 306
Wis. 2d 126, 740 N.W.2d 902 (same).
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courts have found the statute to be narrowly tailored because the series of
decisions prior to the TPR decision—the initial removal order, the adjudication
decision, and the dispositional judgments—ensure that only the rights of unfit
parents are terminated. As one court described, “This series of steps acts as a
funnel, making smaller and smaller the groups of parents whose relationships
with their children are affected at each step . . . .”108 Another noted that Stanley,
while requiring unfitness findings, did not require these findings to occur at one
particular stage.109 Thus, according to these courts, the series of interim findings
can satisfy the constitutionally required unfitness determination.
This reasoning, however, has two principal flaws. First, prior to terminating
a parent’s rights, due process requires that a parent’s unfitness be proven by clear
and convincing evidence.110 But many of the interim decisions that occur in the
child protective process require far lower standards of proof. For example, a
child can be removed from her home under a probable cause standard.111 Many
states permit courts to adjudicate a claim related to a child if there is a
preponderance of evidence demonstrating abuse or neglect.112 Similarly, courts
making decisions at the dispositional stage, involving whether a child should
visit her parent or return home, apply a lower—and often undefined—
standard.113 Relying on a series of interim findings that apply lower standards of
proof does not satisfy the constitutional mandate that unfitness be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.

108. In re Diana P., 2005 WI App 32, at ¶ 32.
109. In re Damone R., 2007 WI App 230U, at ¶ 14.
110. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that a clear and convincing
evidence standard “adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his
factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process”).
111. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.205(1)(a) (West 2011 & 2016 Supp.).
112. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-844 (2014 & Supp.
2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(h)(2)(B) (2015 & Supp. 2015); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§
355 & 355.1 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-505(1) (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b129 (West Supp. 2016); D.C. CODE § 16-2317(b)(2) (2001–2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.507(1)(b)
(West 2010); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 587A-4 (West Supp. 2016); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619(4) (2009 &
Supp. 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100(3) (LexisNexis 2014); LA. CH. CODE art. 665 (2004
& Supp. 2009); ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4035(2) (2004 & Supp. 2016); MD. CTS & JUD.
PROC. § 3-817(c) (LexisNexis 2013); MICH. CT. R. § 3.972(C)(1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21561(3) (West 2008 & Supp. 2013; MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-422(5)(a) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-C:13 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46(b) (West 2013); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 1046(b) (Consol. Supp. 2016); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, §§ 1-4-602 & 1-4-603 (West
2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.310(3) (2015); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 447h (2014); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-7-1660(A) (2010 & Supp. 2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.005 (West 2014 & Supp.
2016); VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5315(a) (2014 & Supp. 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-252(G)
(2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.130 (West 2013 & Supp. 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3425(a) (2015).
113. Most state statutes do not define the standard of proof for court decisions made at the
dispositional stage before a TPR hearing.
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Second, the legal standard for these interim decisions does not require the
courts to actually find a parent to be unfit.114 Justice Abramson of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court discussed this concern extensively in her dissent in In re Diana
P. She wrote:
The problem with this statutory scheme is that the grounds
for denying visitation or placement are not based on the unfitness
of the parent, but are instead based upon the best interests of the
child. No finding or evidence of unfitness is required for these
visitation decisions. This becomes important because there may
be reasons the court did not modify the order denying placement
and visitation, including serious illness, temporary incarceration
or involuntary absence from the jurisdiction, or a judge’s illness
or death, that have little or nothing to do with the unfitness of a
parent.
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.13 provides the grounds that need to
be established to show that a child is in need of protection or
services. Again, the court views these grounds with the focus on
the best interest of the child. Assessing parental unfitness is
irrelevant. . . . The long and the short of it is that a parent may
ultimately be found to be unfit even though the parent’s reasons
for losing visitation and/or placement of one’s child has nothing
to do with whether that parent is unfit. All that need be shown is
that a parent lost placement or visitation and failed to meet the
conditions necessary for reinstating that placement or
visitation.115
Taken together, relying on interim decisions that apply a lower standard of
proof and do not assess a parent’s unfitness cannot satisfy the constitutional test
that a parent’s unfitness be proven by clear and convincing evidence prior to
terminating that parent’s rights.
Finally, a few courts have upheld prior TPR statutes by noting that the
government still bears the burden of clear and convincing evidence at the best
interest stage of the TPR hearing, irrespective of findings or statutory
presumptions of parental unfitness.116 In every jurisdiction across the country,
after a court finds that there are statutory grounds to terminate a parent’s rights,
the parent still has the ability to demonstrate why TPR is contrary to the child’s
114. See Dane Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. P.P. (In re Diana P.), 2005 WI App 32, ¶ 28,
694 N.W.2d 344 (2005) (acknowledging that not every ground in the removal statute goes to a
parent’s fitness).
115. Id. at 365 (Abramson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
116. See, e.g., In re R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014) (noting that neither a finding
of unfitness nor a finding of the best interests of a child alone is enough to warrant involuntary
termination of parental rights); In re K.W., 925 N.E.2d 181, at ¶ 2 (upholding grant of permanent
custody to child services agency where the parent’s other children had also been removed and
where the best interests of the child were demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence).
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best interests. According to these courts, during the best interest stage, the
parents have a right to present evidence that their circumstances have changed
and that they are currently fit, which the court must consider. Thus, the statutes
pass constitutional muster.
This argument misunderstands the burdens placed on a court by Stanley and
Santosky. Stanley and Santosky require the court, prior to terminating a parent’s
rights, to hold a hearing on parental fitness and to find that a parent is unfit by
clear and convincing evidence.117 When considering the child’s best interests,
however, a court need not make a finding that a parent is unfit. Rather, the best
interest finding is a vague, subjective standard that permits the court to consider
a limitless range of factors, including the advantages of the child remaining in
her foster home, to determine what it believes is best for the child.118 It does not
require the court to assess a parent’s fitness. Additionally, when considering best
interest factors, the court, in some jurisdictions, need only find by a
preponderance of evidence—and not clear and convincing evidence—that TPR
is in the child’s best interest.119
In Stanley, the Supreme Court was presented with, and rejected, a similar
argument. There, the State of Illinois argued that even though its statutory
scheme presumed unwed fathers to be unfit without establishing unfitness in
fact, the father nonetheless retained the ability to regain custody through other
proceedings.120 The court summarily dismissed this argument, explicitly stating
that treating parents as presumptively unfit, legal strangers to their children and
then asking them to prove why it would be in their children’s best interest to
have custody violated the Constitution.121 In short, simply giving parents the
opportunity to present evidence related to a child’s best interest is very different
than the constitutional mandate that the State must demonstrate a parent’s
current unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. To equate these two
standards would eviscerate the holdings of Stanley, Santosky, and Quilloin.
As described above, state statutes that permit courts to find grounds to
terminate a parent’s rights based solely on a parent’s prior TPR violate the
117. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that due process requires
parental unfitness to be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 345, 658 (1972) (holding that reliance on a presumption of parental unfitness for unwed
fathers is impermissible under equal protection where other parents are guaranteed a hearing).
118. See, e.g., In re Foster, 776 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Mich. 2009) (allowing courts to consider
the advantages of the foster home in best interests determination); In re K.W., 925 N.E.2d at ¶ 20
(noting that the court may consider factors other than parental fitness including “(1) the interaction
and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, [or] foster caregivers,
. . . (2) the wishes of the child, . . . (3) the custodial history of the child, . . . [and] (4) the child’s
need for a legally secure placement”).
119. See, e.g., In re Moss, 836 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that best
interests need only be proven by a preponderance of evidence); B.J.H. v. B.J.H. (In re B.J.H.), 356
S.W.2d 816, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (same).
120. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647 (rejecting adoption or guardianship proceedings as suitable
alternatives).
121. Id. at 648−49.
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constitutional rights of those parents. The next section proposes a slight, but
substantive, change to federal and state child welfare statutes to fix this
constitutional problem.
V.
A LEGISLATIVE FIX
As the Court noted in Stanley, while the State has an interest in separating
children from dangerous parents, it “registers no gain towards its declared goals
when it separates children from the custody of fit parents.”122 In fact, it “spites
its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates” fit parents from their
family.123 Thus, federal and state statutes must be narrowly tailored to ensure
that the State permanently separates children from only truly unfit parents.
When cases involve a parent whose rights have been previously terminated,
statutes should instruct courts to carefully consider the parent’s prior
termination. To ensure that the State does not unnecessarily terminate the rights
of fit parents, those statutes should also require the State to demonstrate—by
clear and convincing evidence—that the conditions that led to the prior
termination continue to exist. A number of state statutes provide examples of
how this might be done. For example, in Kentucky, a court must find that “the
conditions or factors which were the basis for the previous termination finding
have not been corrected.”124 In Iowa, a court must conclude that “[s]ubsequent
to the child in need of assistance adjudication, the parents were offered or
received services to correct the circumstance which led to the adjudication, and
the circumstance continues to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.”125
And in Oregon, a court must determine whether “the conditions giving rise to the
previous action have not been ameliorated.”126 These statutes require the State to
demonstrate that a parent has not remedied the conditions that led to the prior
determination of her unfitness.
As described in Part III, many state statutes do not do this. Some allow
courts to create irrebuttable presumptions of unfitness based solely on a parent’s
prior TPR regardless of her current fitness.127 Others allow irrebuttable
presumptions, but limit the use of the prior decisions to TPRs that occurred
within a specific time period.128 And a small subset of states provide some
limiting language on how courts can use prior TPRs, but still fail to provide clear
instructions to courts in assessing whether the conditions leading to the previous

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 652.
Id. at 653.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2)(h)(3) (LexisNexis 2014).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116(1)(d)(2) (West 2014 & 2016 Supp.).
OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.502(6) (2015).
See state statutes cited supra note 74.
See state statutes cited supra note 79.
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termination continue to exist.129 For example, Maine places the burden on the
parent to demonstrate that she has the “ability or willingness” to show the court
that she has sought services on her own or could benefit from future services.130
This level of ambiguity invites constitutional violations, especially when the
burden is placed on the parent to make such an undefined showing.
The federal government can guide states on this issue by amending ASFA to
make clear that states must make reasonable efforts to reunify children with fit
parents. It can do so by requiring reasonable efforts to reunify even when parents
have a prior termination unless there is evidence that the parent has failed to
remedy the conditions that led to the prior termination. The current statute does
not contain this limiting language.131 As a result, the government’s invitation for
states to bypass reasonable efforts at reunification for any parent with a prior
termination increases the risk that a state will terminate the parental rights of a fit
parent who successfully addressed the issues that led to the prior TPR. As
recognized by the Supreme Court, the State spites its own goals when it
terminates the rights of currently fit parents.132 By making these small, but
substantive, tweaks to state and federal statutes, legislatures can achieve the
proper balance between protecting children and preserving the important
relationships children have with fit parents.
Until these changes occur, advocates representing parents and children
should continue to challenge the constitutionality of current statutes. Where a
parent has remedied the conditions that led to a previous termination, they must
demand that the State make reasonable efforts to keep the family together.133
They must require the State to demonstrate that a parent is currently unfit and
not allow it to prove its case by relying solely on evidence of the parent’s past
conduct. And they must be diligent in preserving these constitutional challenges
at the trial court level so that appellate courts—like those in Florida, Michigan,
and Kansas134—can have the opportunity to invalidate unconstitutional statutes.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Unless states amend their current statutes, a strong possibility exists that
courts will terminate the rights of fit parents based solely on their past
129. See state statutes cited supra note 75.
130. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (1-A)(D) (2004 & Supp. 2016).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2012) (providing that states are not obligated to make
reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify families when “the parental rights of the parent to a
sibling have been terminated involuntarily”).
132. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653 (1972).
133. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing cases from Florida, Kansas, and Michigan in which
appellate courts have required the State to show that the parent did not remedy the conditions that
led to the prior TPR).
134. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004); In re Gach,
2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 783 (Apr. 19, 2016); In re J.L., 891 P.2d 1125, 1125 (Kan. Ct. App.
1995).
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transgressions. Not only does this practice violate the Constitution, but it also
undermines the State’s interest in keeping children with fit parents. Courts must
be vigilant in protecting the constitutional rights of parents in these cases, and
federal and state legislatures should amend current statutes to prevent this from
happening. Small, but substantive, legislative changes can ensure the protection
of important rights. Until then, advocates must be diligent in protecting the rights
of parents.

